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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the measurement of credit risk capital requirements under the 
new Basel Accord (Basel II): the Internal Rating Based approach (IRB). It focuses in the 
analytical formula for its calculation, since its derivation to the main assumptions 
behind it. We also estimate the credit loss distribution for the Uruguayan portfolio in 
the period 1999-2006, using a non parametric technique, the bootstrap. Its main 
advantage is that we don’t need to make any assumptions about the form of the 
distribution. Finally, we compare the requirements obtained using the IRB with the 
estimated ones, as an approximation of the application of the IRB in the Uruguayan 
financial system.   
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Loan portfolio loss distribution: Basel II unifactorial approach 
vs. Non parametric estimations 
 
I. Introduction  
Financial institutions, and particularly banks, are exposed to different risks, which are 
inherent to the nature of their activities. Taking the simplest definition, we can define 
a bank as an institution whose habitual operations consist in giving loans and taking 
deposits from the public. In this definition, one can observe that risk could derive from 
the counterparty as well as from the mismatch that emerges from the asset 
transformation that banks make. Principal risks can be resumed in: credit risk, market 
risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. This paper will focus on credit risk analysis, 
which derives from the probability that the borrower defaults on his obligations. It is 
necessary to require banks to maintain a minimum of capital to cover potential losses 
due to this risk, which leads to the need for a proper system to measure it.  
In 1988, Basel Committee proposed some recommendations to improve banking 
regulation (Basel I Accord), which were adopted by most part of world regulators and 
were considered as “best practices”.  This Accord represented a first step towards 
capital requirement based on credit risk, as it established fixed weights according to 
the risk associated with every exposure
1
. Different categories of exposures were 
determined in a simple way, and they did not allow for a proper measure of credit risk. 
As an example, all borrowers from non financial sector had the same weight. Financial 
system changed dramatically since that first Basel Accord.  
                                                           
 
1
 Minimum regulatory capital is calculated as:   
Regulatory Capital= Risk Weight  x  Exposure  x 8%  =  Risk-weighted Assets x 8% 
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In 1996, the Accord incorporated an amendment to require capital to cover market 
risk, defined as “the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices”
2
. Basel Committee permits to choose between two broad 
methodologies: a standardized manner (which has been proposed in 1993) and 
internal models (VaR).  
Despite this breakthrough, the restrictions of the agreement of 1988 require an 
adaptation of the former, which is intended to be carried out within Basel II. The 
principal purpose is to make capital requirement more risk-sensitive, and also the 
promotion of the use of internal models to measure it. The Committee has built the 
supervisory process around three pillars:  
1. Minimum capital requirements 
2. Supervisory review process 
3. Market discipline 
In relation to the first pillar, the Accord of 1988 opted for a standardized approach, in 
which different risk were weighted according to the borrower’s category. Basel II 
incorporates important changes in this pillar, introducing capital requirements for 
operational risk and significantly modifying the measurement of credit risk. Although it 
maintains the capital adequacy ratio at 8%, the way banks measure capital 
requirements is different. The rest of the pillars are new; pillar two refers to the 
supervision process, which must ensure that banks have adequate capital to support 
all the risk in their business, and also encourage institutions to develop and use better 
risk management techniques in monitoring and managing risks. The Committee has 
identified four key principles of supervisory review. First, banks must be able to 
demonstrate that chosen internal capital targets are well founded and that these 
targets are consistent with their overall risk profile. Secondly, supervisors must review 
and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as 
their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Third and fourth principles refer to the ability of supervisor to require banks to hold 
capital in excess of the minimum, and the early intervention to prevent capital from 
falling below the minimum levels required to support its risks. Lastly, pillar three aims 
to promote a more competitive and transparent market, which reinforces the two 
previous pillars. These three pillars work together towards ensuring the capital 
adequacy of institutions. They are more potent when working together within a 
common framework. 
 
This paper will focus on the analysis of the first pillar, and particularly in capital 
requirements for credit risk. Related to this, the new accord has modified the risk-
weighted assets definition: ‘the new approaches for calculating risk-weighted assets 
are intended to provide improved bank assessments of risk and thus to make the 
resulting capital ratios more meaningful.’ 
3
 One of the main advantages of this new 
                                                           
2
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) 
3
 Overview of the new Basel capital accord, Consultative document; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2003) 
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accord is that it generates incentives for banks to develop more sophisticated risk 
management techniques. To assess credit risk, Basel II allows to choose between two 
methods: standardized approach and internal rating based approach IRB (foundation 
and advanced). In the standardized approach, which is similar to the current Accord, 
banks are required to slot their credit exposures into supervisory categories based on 
observable characteristics of the exposures (e.g. whether the exposure is a corporate 
loan or a residential mortgage loan. Fixed risk weights are established corresponding 
to each supervisory category and external credit assessments are used to enhance risk 
sensitivity. The IRB approach differs substantially from standardized approach, as 
banks internal assessments of key risk drivers are the principal inputs to measure 
credit risk. Capital requirements are determined by combining quantitative inputs 
provided by banks and formulas specified by the Committee. In Uruguay, regulation is 
based on the standardized approach. Capital requirements are detailed in the Article 
14.1 of the Compilation of Central Bank norms (circulars) for the regulation and control 
of the financial system, where is stated that: “capital requirement for credit risk is 
equivalent to the 8% of risk-weighted assets”. Risk weights for each category range 
from 0% to 125%. 
 
The paper aims to serve as a first approximation to how the application of the 
foundation IRB could be in Uruguayan financial system, given that regulation has 
developed in line with Basel II spirit. During last years, and after financial crisis of 2002, 
the Superintendence of Financial Institutions (SFI) has substantially modified 
regulation with the purpose of giving more information to markets, thus having a more 
transparent and competitive banking sector as well as protecting agents when takings 
their decisions. Related to capital requirements, market risk has been incorporated in 
2006, and there have been advances in credit risk measurement. Although the 
standardized method is used, regulation about credits classification introduced the 
analysis of debtors’ cash flows, thus evaluating their ability to pay, and also requiring 
stress scenarios to assess it.  This contributes to a better analysis of credit risk, and also 
provides a useful data base in case banks decide to use IRB approach. More recently, a 
regulation allows for the use of internal model to assess credit risk in small borrowers. 
All these changes make of the analysis an important tool to be aware of IRB 
implications when using it to measure capital requirements.  
In the first part of the paper, we present IRB principal characteristics, emphasizing the 
analysis of the formula that Basel II proposed to calculate risk weights. Therefore, we 
focus on its main assumptions and its implications for developing financial systems 
The second part will make use of a non parametric technique to estimate credit loss 
distribution of banking portfolio, to have a measure of expected and unexpected loses 
(VaR). Data covers private banking sector, during period 1999-2006, and we run 
different estimations distinguishing between corporate and retail portfolio. Having 
obtained these estimations, we compare them with the ones that would emerge in the 
case of using IRB approach formulas.  
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II. Basel II and the IRB approach        
Banks activity could be seen as taking risks. During certain period of time, for example 
a year, it is common to observe that some borrowers do not pay their obligations. The 
bank can not exactly calculate the amount of such losses, but it can estimate the loss it 
expects to have at the end of the year. That measure is called expected loss (EL), and 
represents the amount of capital that the bank could lose as a result of its exposure to 
credit risk, given a time horizon. Such losses can be seen as the cost of doing banking 
business, and should be covered by provisions that banks make on each loan. 
However, losses could exceed that expected level, and more capital is thus needed to 
absorb them. These are known as unexpected loss (UL). Taking portfolio loss 
distribution, we can represent expected loss by its mean.  
Figure 1  
 
In Figure 1
4
, unexpected loss is defined as the difference between the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) and expected losses. The likelihood that losses will exceed the sum of expected 
Loss (EL) and Unexpected Loss (UL) - i.e. the likelihood that a bank will not be able to 
meet its own credit obligations by its profits and capital - equals the hatched area 
under the right hand side of the curve. 100% minus this likelihood is called the 
confidence level and the corresponding threshold is called Value-at-Risk (VaR) at this 
confidence level. VaR analysis constitutes an important tool when measuring risks, and 
given that Basel II aims to have more risk-sensitive capital requirements, this kind of 
analysis has been incorporated in the new accord.  
 
In this section we present the main aspects related to IRB approach, and basic 
consideration one must take into account when applying it. We deepen in the analysis 
of the formula used to determine capital requirements for unexpected loss. Last part 
of this section analyses principal assumptions of the model, giving a better 
understanding of this approach, especially for emerging economies.  
 
                                                           
4
 Extracted from An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions, 2005 
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1. IRB Fundamentals 
The IRB approach is based in both expected and unexpected losses. Risk weights and 
capital requirements are determined by combining quantitative data from bank with 
formulas specified by the Committee.  There are three key elements in IRB approach. 
The first are the Risk Components, which can be divided in: 
 
 Default Probability (PD): quantifies the likelihood that the borrower will default 
in the coming twelve months.  
 Loss Given Default (LGD): is the loss that the bank will suffer if the counterparty 
defaults. It is expressed as a percentage of the exposure. 
  Exposure at Default (EAD): is the exposure of the bank at the moment the 
obligor goes into default. 
 Maturity (M): the amount of time until the loan is fully due and payable. 
The second element is Risk-weight Functions, in which risk components are 
transformed into risk-weighted assets and therefore capital requirements.  
The last component is Minimum Requirements; these are minimum standards that 
must be met in order for a bank to use IRB approach. These standards are based 
fundamentally in rating and risk estimation systems and processes, which must 
provide for a meaningful assessment of borrower and transaction characteristics, a 
meaningful differentiation of risk; and reasonably accurate and consistent quantitative 
estimates of risk.  
 
There are two types of IRB: foundation and advanced. In the first one, banks estimate 
PD and the rest of the parameters are established by the Committee. In the advanced 
IRB, all parameters are estimated by the financial institution.  
Under the IRB approach, banks must categorize banking-book exposures into broad 
classes of assets with different underlying risk characteristics; these are: corporate, 
sovereign, bank, retail and equity. Within the corporate asset class, five sub-classes of 
specialized lending (SL) are separately identified, while for retail portfolio three sub-
classes are determined. This is based in the fact that each exposure requires a different 
treatment because they have different risk-drivers. This work will focus on corporate 
and retail portfolios. Basel II allows for the inclusion in retail portfolios loans to small 
enterprises, if the exposure is below € 1 million.  
 
Once the exposures are categorized and PD’s are calculated, one should apply the 
formula proposed by the Committee to determine capital requirements. That formula 
will be analyzed in next sections, and can be expressed as follows: 
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K = capital requirement 
LGD = loss given default 
PD = default probability 
ρ = assets correlation 
M = maturity 
As we mentioned above, this formula generates capital requirements to cover 
unexpected loss, while expected loss is treated separately. Banks applying IRB must 
compare the total amount of eligible provisions with the total EL amount as calculated 
within the IRB approach (EL=PD*LGD). Where the calculated EL amount is lower than 
the provisions of the bank, its supervisors must consider whether the EL fully reflects 
the conditions in the market in which it operates before allowing the difference to be 
included in Tier 2 capital (with a maximum of 0.6% of risk-weight assets). Where the 
opposite is true, the difference is subtracted from capital (50% from Tier 1 and 50% 
from Tier 2). 
 
2. Risk weight functions 
A first characteristic of the IRB approach is that the model should be portfolio 
invariant; that is, the capital required for any loan should only depend on the risk of 
that loan and must not depend on the portfolio it is added to. Under this assumption, 
specific characteristics (PD, LGD and EAD) of each borrower are enough to calculate 
capital requirement for each loan.  
It can be shown that
5
 only Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) models are portfolio 
invariant; these models are derived from traditional credit models by the law of large 
numbers. When a portfolio consists of a large number of small exposures, idiosyncratic 
risks associated with individual exposures tend to cancel out one-another and only 
systematic risks that affect many exposures have a significant effect on portfolio 
losses. Vasicek (2002) has demonstrated that under certain circumstances, Merton’s 
model of 1974 can be adapted to an ASRF one. In this kind of models, all systematic 
risks that affect all borrowers, like industry or regional risks, are modeled with only one 
systematic risk factor. 
 
Consider a portfolio consisting of n loans. The value of the assets of a borrower i can 
be described as a geometrical Brownian motion, as stated in equation 3.  
 [3] 
where   is a Wiener process,  ,   
Thus the value of assets at T can be expressed as:  
 [4] 
so it can be established that: 
                                                           
5
 Gordy, 2003 
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 [5] 
 
where zi is a standard normal random variable. 
Basel’s II formula uses Merton’s model interpretation of default probability of the 
borrower i, so an obligor will default if the value of his assets falls below the value of 
his debt:  
 [6] 
 
Remembering that N [-d2] is default probability, and calling it by letter p, then N[ci] =p, 
and therefore ci=N
-1
[p].  
zi is assumed to have the following expression: 
 [7] 
where y represents systemic risk affecting the entire portfolio and iε  is the specific risk 
for borrower i. It is assumed that both of them follow standard normal distributions, 
and the values for b and a are given by: 
 ρρ −== 1;ab  
ρ measures the asset correlation between borrowers’ assets. It could be described as 
the dependence of the assets of a borrower on the general state of the economy; so all 
borrowers are linked to each other by the single risk factor. If we are talking about a 
dollarized economy, we can think in the exchange rate as the single risk factor, 
because a strong movement in that variable substantially affects loan portfolios.  
Under those conditions, default probability of any loan, conditional on the single risk 
factor y, can be written as: 
 [8] 
 
From equation [6], can be noticed that [ ]pNci 1−=  , so replacing in [8] we have 
 
 [9] 
 
Total portfolio consists on n identical individuals, with the same participation in total 
exposure. Being Li the gross portfolio loss (before recoveries) for borrower i, so that 
Li=1 if the obligor defaults and Li=0 if the opposite is true, total gross portfolio loss can 
be expressed as: 
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 [10] 
 
We can establish that the percentage of default on total portfolio equals the number 
of individuals that default on their obligations. If n is large enough, by the law of the 
large numbers it can be stated that the fraction of clients L that default on their debts 
is equal to the default probability conditional on y,  
  
 [11] 
 
Thus the cumulative distribution function of loan losses on a very large portfolio is in the 
limit
6
: 


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ρ )(1)( 11 pNxN
N                                           [12] 
The VaR at 99.9% confidence level is thus: 
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And default probability can be expressed like follows: 
                                                                                                 [14] 
 
 
Until now we have derived most part of Basel formula. The complete risk weight 
function for capital requirements to cover unexpected loss is: 
  
 [15] 
                                                           
6
 Convergence of the portfolio loss distribution to the limiting form actually holds even for 
portfolios with unequal weights. Let the portfolio weights are wi, with 1
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Calling PD the default probability previously defined as p, we can observe that the 
formula generates capital requirement for unexpected loss, given that the LGD is 
multiplied by the difference between the PD’s VaR at 99.9% confidence level and the 
expected PD. That parameter is estimated by banks, in the foundation IRB as well as in 
the advanced. 
It is worthy to comment some properties of this distribution function
7
. The cumulative 
distribution is given by the expression: 
 [16] 
 
Thus, if we want to obtain the density function we must calculate the derivative of 
expression [16],  
 
The measures of position for this density function are:  
•  
•  
•                 if ρ<1/2 
Variance is given by: 
•  
being  the bivariate normal distribution function. 
Graph 1 
Density function (rho= 0.2, PD= 0.04)
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 Demonstrations are presented in Appendix A. 
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When ρ>1/2, density is U-shaped, which means that when correlation is high, bank 
result could be very good, in case all firms perform well, or really bad, in case all of 
them incur in default. Graph 2 illustrates this case.  
Graph 2 
Density function (rho= 0.8, PD= 0.04)
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One can think about a dollarized economy, where banks do not have problems in case 
they face a stable exchange rate, but in case of a negative realization of this risk-driver, 
the financial system immediately would show bad results, thus being in the other 
extreme of the distribution.  
In the particular case for ρ=1/2, function is monotone.  
Graph 3 
Density function (rho= 0.5, PD= 0.04)
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Lastly, when correlation is perfect, so that ρ=1, density tends to the binomial 
distribution, .  
In Graph 1 we can see that loss distribution is asymmetrical. This pattern has 
implications when requiring capital, as it generates higher requirements that in the 
normal distribution’s case.  
Correlation coefficients were determined based on G10 data. Two main assumptions 
are made. The first one is that correlations have an inverse relationship with PD. The 
higher the PD is for a firm, the lower its correlation to the single risk factor. This is an 
empirical observation, as it is observed that when PD is high, it means that 
idiosyncratic risk prevails, so the risk is driven by its own characteristics and does not 
depend on the general state of the economy. The second assumption is that size of the 
firm is directly related to PD. The bigger the company, the higher the PD. As companies 
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become bigger, they are more dependent on the state of the economy. Correlation is 
then calculated as follows: 
 
 
Where 0.12 corresponds to maximum PD (100%) correlation, and 0.24 is the 
correlation for lowest PD (0%). Each of them is multiplied by exponential weights, 
which display the dependency on PD. Last term corresponds to a size adjustment, 
which affects borrowers with annual sales between €5 million and €50 million. For 
borrowers with €50 million annual sales and above, the size adjustment becomes zero, 
and for borrowers with €5 million or less annual sales, the size adjustment takes the 
value of 0.04, thus lowering the asset correlation from 24% to 20% (best credit quality) 
and from 12% to 8% (worst credit quality). 
 
For most retail loans,
8
 correlation is determined as stated below:  
 
 
Last term of equation [15] is a maturity adjustment
9
, as it was assumed that all loans 
had a one-year maturity. Empirical evidence shows that long-term loans are riskier that 
short-term ones, so capital requirements should be higher for longer maturities. This 
could be seen as the additional requirements that would emerge for possible credit 
downgrades, which are more likely to happen in long-term loans.  
The adjustment has the following form: 
 
Where  is: 
[ ]2)ln(05478.011852.0)( PDPDb −=  
Adjustments are linear and increasing in M. The reason is that the lower de PD, the 
loan is more likely to be downgraded, so it is riskier. The slope of the adjustment 
function with respect to M decreases as the PD increases. Next Figure presents a 
matrix which contains the values of the adjustment for different PD and M.  
                                                           
8
 Except for mortgage and revolving loans, where correlations are fixed, taking values of 0.15 and 0.04 
respectively.  
9
 This adjustment does not apply for retail exposures 
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Figure 2: Maturity adjustment 
M 1% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00% 8.00% 9.00% 10.00%
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1.1732 1.1328 1.1128 1.1000 1.0908 1.0837 1.0780 1.0732 1.0692 1.0658
3 1.3464 1.2657 1.2256 1.1999 1.1815 1.1673 1.1559 1.1465 1.1385 1.1315
4 1.5196 1.3985 1.3384 1.2999 1.2723 1.2510 1.2339 1.2197 1.2077 1.1973
5 1.6928 1.5314 1.4512 1.3999 1.3630 1.3346 1.3118 1.2929 1.2769 1.2630
6 1.8660 1.6642 1.5640 1.4999 1.4538 1.4183 1.3898 1.3662 1.3461 1.3288
7 2.0392 1.7971 1.6768 1.5998 1.5445 1.5020 1.4678 1.4394 1.4154 1.3946
9 2.3857 2.0627 1.9024 1.7998 1.7260 1.6693 1.6237 1.5859 1.5538 1.5261
10 2.5589 2.1956 2.0152 1.8998 1.8168 1.7529 1.7016 1.6591 1.6230 1.5918
B(PD) 0.13749     0.11077    0.09648    0.08694   0.07988     0.07433    0.06980    0.06599    0.06271    0.05986    
Probabilidad de default
 
It should be noticed that for M=1, . From Figure 2, it can also be 
seen that there exists a negative relationship between the adjustment and PD for any 
given M.  
3. Principal assumptions behind the risk weight function 
3.1  The two main assumptions 
There are two strict assumptions behind Basel’s II formula: bank’s credit portfolio is 
infinitely fine-grained, and there is a single systematic risk factor which drives all 
dependence across credit losses in the portfolio. 
First assumption implies that any single obligor represents a very small share of the 
portfolio’s total exposure. For the traditional Merton’s model to be adapted to an 
ASRF model, Vasicek (2002) has demonstrated that it is necessary that the loan 
portfolio consists of a large number of small exposures. If this assumption is not met, 
then there will be an undiversified idiosyncratic risk, which results in an 
underestimated capital requirement. In view of this kind of situation, Vasicek (2002) 
proponed a granularity adjustment which can be applied when the portfolio is not 
sufficiently large for the law of large numbers to take hold. 
  
In equation [14], granularity adjustment could take place by taking ρ + δ (1-ρ) instead 
of ρ.  
Being ∑
=
=
n
i
iw
1
2δ   
The second main assumption is the existence of a single systematic risk factor. 
Diversification effects, like regional or industry branch, are not considered. This failure 
to recognize the diversification effects could result in an overestimation of portfolio 
risk, especially for banks that have properly diversified its risks. Industries are subject 
to different kind of risks and cycles, and they should be separate modeled. Some 
recent papers suggest the use of multi-factor frameworks to reflect diversification 
effects. Céspedes et al (2005) estimate a model based on what the called 
‘diversification factor’, which is a function of two parameters that broadly capture size 
concentration and the average cross-sector correlation. Tasche (2005) incorporates 
diversification effects by including a diversification index, where VaR contributions of 
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each factor are calculated. Capital requirements can be substantially reduced when the 
portfolio is well-diversified. 
3.2  Asset correlations  
Another crucial factor that affects capital requirements is the calculation of asset 
correlation. That formula assumes that there exists a positive relationship between 
asset correlation and size of the firm. This is based on the idea that smaller firms have 
a higher component of idiosyncratic risk, thus having less correlation with the general 
state of the economy. Most research in this area confirms this assumption
10
. However, 
an argument against this evidence could be found in Bernanke et al (1996). They claim 
that bigger firms have access to financial markets in case of negative shocks, while 
small and medium companies do not have it, thus being more exposed to state of the 
economy. Debtors with higher agency costs in credit markets (small firms) will burden 
the costs of economic recessions; the so called flight to quality. 
To calculate correlations, it is also assumed that the relationship between PD and asset 
correlation is negative. In contrast with the previous assumption, there is no consensus 
about this. Düllmann y Scheule (2003) analyzed asset correlation as a measure of 
systematic credit risk from a database of balance sheet information of German 
companies, finding that it increases with firm size but the relationship with PD is not 
unambiguous. Dietsch y Petey (2003) estimated asset correlations in two large 
populations of French and German SMEs. They found that, on average, the relationship 
between PDs and correlations is not negative as assumed by Basel II. It is U shaped in 
France, and positive in Germany. They conclude that capital requirements could be too 
high for SMEs, where correlation is lower.  
  
Critics also come from PD’s modellization. Rosch (2002) argues that PD is not constant 
over time, and that it depends on macro economical conditions, so when calculating 
PD’s one must incorporate proxy variables for the business cycles. That would reduce 
uncertainty about PD, and also correlations and capital requirements. Hamerle et al 
(2003) also introduce macro economical factors in their estimation, and propose a 
time-dependent PD, thus obtaining lower correlations. 
 
In conclusion, capital requirements are said to be highly sensitive to asset correlations; 
if they are lower than the ones that result from Basel II, capital requirements are much 
lower and vice versa. Parameter’s calibration is therefore crucial; Basel II has used data 
from the group of ten major supervisors (G-10), which may not be suitable for 
emerging economies. In particular, exponential weights could be too high. The pace of 
the exponential function is determined by the “k-factor”, which is set at 50, generating 
a fast decline. From Graph 4, it is noticeable how changes in k-factor can smooth the 
function, thus enlarging the range between minimum and maximum PD.  
                                                           
10
 Dietsch and Petey (2003), Düllmann and Scheule (2003) 
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Gaph 4 
 
3.3 Loss given default  
To determine the LGD, the Committee proposed a determinist value, when one can 
think that LGD is a random variable which take values between 0 and 1, and also that 
there may exists a dependence relationship between LGD and PD. Altman et al (2002) 
found a positive relationship, and they argue that it must be considered in the analysis, 
as it increases capital requirements. The same factors that affect PD also affect LGD. 
Hillebrand (2006) estimated a model for the portfolio loss including dependence of PD 
and LGD on the economic cycle. He states that LGD depends on the general state of 
the economy, and it has to be incorporated when measuring credit risk. In a recession, 
for example, the value of collateral decreases considerably, and therefore the LGD is 
much higher.  
 
Criticism also relates to the LGD estimation, as banks may have different measures 
according to the model they use. This applies also for PD’s estimation.  
3.4 Confidence level 
Confidence is set at 99.9%, recognizing that it may result too high. Basel’s argument is 
that this exigency covers possible measurement errors in estimation (institutions with 
well-specified and calibrated models will be punished with higher capital requirements 
that they may not need). 
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Graph 5 
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As it can be observed in Graph 5, if the confidence level is reduced by 0.9%, capital 
requirement is significantly lower.  
This conservative criterion is also observed when calculating market risk capital 
requirement, where the VaR is multiplied by a minimal factor of 3, which also pretends 
to reflect measurement error in estimations.  
Previous graph also shows how from certain levels of PD, capital requirement starts 
decreasing rather fast, as a consequence of the increase of expected loss component, 
which becomes zero when PD equals unity (that is, when the borrower is in default), as 
there is not unexpected loss.  
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III. Non parametric estimation of credit loss distribution and comparison 
with IRB approach                             
When estimating capital requirements to cover unexpected losses due to credit risk it 
is necessary to obtain the parameters of the distribution function of loss portfolio. 
There exists different methodologies to calculate them; in this paper we opt for the 
procedure proposed by Carey (1998, 2002), where he estimated portfolio loss 
distribution using a non parametric technique, known as bootstrap. The main idea is 
that the sample itself is the best guide to infer the distribution. The principal 
advantage of this method is that we do not need to make assumptions about the 
functional shape and the parameters of that distribution; the only assumption is that 
the sample is representative enough. The bootstrap consists on simulating a large 
number of portfolios, extracting, with reposition, the loss rate for each of them. The 
frequency distribution of that loss rates is the estimation of the relevant distribution 
function.  
Majnoni, Miller y Powell (2004) conducted a boostrapping exercise for three countries 
(Argentina, Mexico and Brazil) to replicate the distribution of credit losses prevailing at 
a specific period of time. Their paper concludes that capital requirements that emerge 
from IRB are lower that the estimated ones for the cases of Argentina and Mexico, 
while the opposite is true for Brazil. It should be noticed that results are based in date 
from only one year, while this technique requires having a larger period, to cover 
economical cycles. Jacobson, Lindé y Roszbach (2005) also applied Carey’s 
nonparametric method to two banks’ complete loan portfolios, to compare the risk 
associated with small and medium enterprises (SME) with big corporate portfolios. 
Lastly, the paper of Gutiérrez Girault (2007) estimates conditional and unconditional 
loss distributions for loan portfolios of argentine banks, to compare with Basel’s II 
requirements. His exercise controlled by type of borrower and type of bank, and 
covered the period 1999-2004. 
 
1. Data and methodology 
1.1 Non parametric estimation  
The approximation to estimate credit loss distribution follows the work of Carey (1998, 
2002). In his paper of 1998 he estimates the credit risk associated with private debt 
portfolios, reporting non parametric estimates of the size of losses in the bad tail, 
using Monte Carlo resampling methods. Portfolios are simulated extracting different 
assets from total sample, repeating this procedure 50.000 times. Empirical losses are 
computed for each drawn portfolio, and the frequency distribution of such losses is the 
relevant loss distribution.  
The term bootstrap was introduced in 1979 by Efron, although the type of 
methodology was being used since time before. It is a computer-intensive method, 
which allows to make statistical inference without making hypothesis about population 
distribution (F).  This method starts from the concept of bootstrap sample. Taking   
as the empirical distribution, a bootstrap sample is defined as a random sample of size 
n, obtained from ,  
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x*=(x1*, x2*… xn*) 
→ (x1*, x2*… xn*) 
The supra index * means that we are not dealing with the original data set, as it is a 
random version or resampling of  x. This values are a sample of size n extracted with 
replacement from the original sample (x1, x2,….., xn), so each bootstrap sample consists 
of n values of the original sample, where some of them could appear more than once 
or even not be included. For every bootstrap sample, the same function applied to the 
original data, s (.) , is then calculated.  
 
For example, if s(x) is the sample mean  , then s(x*) is the bootstrap sample mean, 
.  
Both the construction of the bootstrap sample and the calculus of the relevant statistic 
are repeated B times, constructing a frequency distribution which will constitute the 
relevant probability function.  
1.2 Data 
Data is obtained from the Credit Registry of the Superintendence of Financial 
Institutions (SIIF) - Central Bank of Uruguay. Banks and other financial intermediaries 
send to the Credit Registry information about transactions, which include data about 
borrowers (name, business activity, document) and about their debts (amount, type of 
facility, collateral). From the total database, we only consider those credits that were 
performing at the beginning of every period
11
, excluding those that were in non 
performing categories. Then we observe the performance of each loan, particularly if it 
has been included in non performing categories. To determine if the credit is non- 
performing, we follow the same criterion of the SIIF’s Accounting Scheme; that is, if 
the loan payments are past due by 60 days or more. If the credit has been written off, 
it is also considered as default, while if the credit has been cancelled it is considered as 
a recovery.  
The analysis will cover the period 1999–2006, thus covering the deep crisis that the 
Uruguayan economy suffered in 2002, as well as its following recovery.  By this way, 
unconditional distribution will be representative. Data come from private banks only, 
thus excluding the activity of public banks.  
Portfolio will be classified according to the type of borrower, following SIIF regulations. 
It allows for the distinction between corporate and retail sectors. This segmentation 
aims to match Basel’s II categorization.  
Exposure at default is determined by total risks of a borrower, minus the coverage of 
liquid collaterals (as they are totally recovered after a default event). It is also assumed 
                                                           
11
 As starting point of each period we took December of every year. 
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that the rate of recovery for mortgage collaterals is 30% of the balance sheet value. 
Lastly, LGD is assumed to be 50%. 
We defined a variable Li which take the value Li=1 in case of default and Li=0 if the loan 
remains performing or has been cancelled.  
∑
∑
=
=
××
=
n
i
i
n
i
ii
Exposure
ExposureL
rateloss
1
1
%50
.  
Defining the exposure as follows: 
Exposure = Total Risks– Liquid Collaterals – 30% Mortgage Collaterals 
Non parametric estimations were done for each year during the period 1999-2006, and 
for each type of borrower. Simulations included 20.000 repeats for conditional as well 
as unconditional distribution. The size of the portfolios was determined according to 
the observed data for every year, taking the average size for private financial system. 
For the unconditional distribution, the average of 1999-2006 was taken
12
. The process 
can be summarized in next picture. 
 
2. Results 
2.1 Corporate portfolio 
Next we present the results obtained from the bootstrapping for corporate portfolio. 
Table 1 reports the main indicators of loss distribution: expected loss, standard 
deviation and the 99.9th percentile (VaR measure). The first three columns show 
estimations in million dollars, but we are interested in losses relative to the total 
exposure, so the next three columns calculate that. Last column measures the 
                                                           
12
 The process was also calculated taking the size of the portfolio as the total number of observations for 
every year and results were not significantly different.  
calculate main statistics:  
mean, standard deviation an  
99.9th percentile 
original sample: performing  
loans at the beginning of each  
year 
compute observed loss rate for  
each of the 20.000 porfolios  
and construct a frequency  
selection of B samples:  
B=20.000 
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unexpected loss, which is the difference between the 99.9th percentile and the 
expected loss.  
Table 1: Estimation for corporate portfolio 
Expected St. Dev. 99.9th percentile Expected St. Dev. 99.9th percentile
1999-2000 4,89 1,47 10,90 2,12% 0,67% 4,93% 2,81%
2000-2001 4,84 1,44 10,50 1,91% 0,60% 4,35% 2,44%
2001-2002 35,40 6,57 61,10 11,81% 2,40% 20,81% 8,99%
2002-2003 2,49 0,81 5,65 1,47% 0,51% 3,68% 2,21%
2003-2004 11,60 9,65 59,30 4,40% 3,29% 17,64% 13,24%
2004-2005 5,84 6,28 40,10 2,51% 2,49% 13,45% 10,94%
2005-2006 1,95 1,69 10,70 1,18% 1,00% 6,23% 5,05%
incondicional 11,20 4,40 34,80 4,72% 1,73% 13,22% 8,50%
Losses in million USD Loss rate Unexpected 
loss
 
Looking at the period 1999-2000, expected loss of portfolio is USD 4,89 million. The 
credit VaR at 99,9% confidence level is USD 10,9 million. The frequency distribution is 
presented below, where it can be noticed the asymmetrical shape that characterizes 
credit risk distributions
13
. As we mentioned before, this asymmetry implies that the 
likelihood of high losses is higher than in the case of a normal distribution.          
Graph 6- Credit loss distribution for period 1999-2000 
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From Table 1 one can also extract statistics for the loss rate, which has an expected 
value of 2,12%, the VaR at 99.9% is 4,93% and the unexpected loss is thus 2,81%.  
It is noticeable from Table 1 that financial crisis of 2002 had an important impact in our 
estimations. Expected loss increased significantly, as well as the volatility of the 
distribution. For the next periods we observe a higher standard deviation too, which 
could be indicating that financial system became more fragile. It should be mentioned 
that the low values obtained for period 2002-2003 could be attributed to the fact that 
after financial crisis the loans that remain in the sample were only the good ones. To 
illustrate this argument, in 2001-2002 there were 12.000 observations while for the 
years  2002-2003 they reduced by almost a half.  
Once obtained the non parametric estimations, we compared estimated requirements 
with IRB approach ones. To calculate IRB formula, it is assumed that LGD is 45% 
(defined in Basel Committee final document) and the values for PD are the ones that 
emerge from bootstrap estimation. In other words, taking into account that expected 
loss can be defined as: 
                                                           
13
 Appendix B presents estimations for each year. 
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EL = PD*LGD 
Using EL estimations from Table 1, one can obtain the value of PD consistent with a 
LGD of 45%.  
Basel II also proposed a size adjustment to be included in the formula. When analyzing 
the pertinence of doing so for Uruguayan companies, we observed that for May and 
June of 2007, more than a half of firms were small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
whose annual sales are below USD 5 million. So it is necessary to reflect this situation 
when calculating capital requirements. To do that, we consider that before the crisis of 
2002, the percentage of SMEs was similar to actual rates, while in the two years after 
crisis, only big companies ‘survived’. 
A maturity adjustment also needs to be done, to reflect the fact that during all the 
period of analysis most part of loans had a maturity of less of one year. Results are 
reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Comparison of IRB and Non parametric estimations for corporate portfolio 
1999-2000 8,57% 3,04
2000-2001 8,23% 3,38
2001-2002 16,54% 1,84
2002-2003 7,49% 3,38
2003-2004 13,93% 1,05
2004-2005 11,02% 1,01
2005-2006 6,95% 1,38
unconditional 12,17% 1,43
IRB/Estim.period K (IRB)
 
First column in Table 2 reports the capital requirement generated from IRB formulas, 
while in the second column that requirement is divided into the estimated one by the 
bootstrapping process. As it can be observed, results are not homogeneous. Before 
2003, Basel’s II requirements are much higher than estimated ones, while after that 
year IRB requirements seems to be closer to the non parametric estimation. A factor 
that may be explaining those differences could be the measurement of asset 
correlations. The formula proposed by Basel depends on PD, and as mentioned before, 
it is assumed that correlation with systematic risk has a negative relationship with PD. 
Next graph shows that relationship, and also how correlation arrives at its minimum 
for low values of PD (thus the so called k-factor results too high). For low values of PD, 
correlation is too high and the range of intermediate correlations is too short. 
Therefore, it is indicating that parameters’ calibration was thought for developed 
economies, where low PDs prevail. 
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Graph 7 - PD and correlation in IRB approach 
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The differences we obtain thus indicate that for years previous to the financial crisis, 
correlations calculated from IRB are too high, therefore generating a higher capital 
requirement than the estimated one. However, during last years of analysis results 
show that firms are more dependent on the general state of the economy, as the 
capital requirements is closer to estimations. Given that is hard to obtain data to 
estimate asset correlations for Uruguayan firms, we used bootstrapping estimations to 
infer the asset correlations implicit in them. That is, taking the estimated capital 
requirement, we use Basel’s formula to determine which correlation is required to 
yield that result.  
Table 3: Asset correlations 
estimated ρ Basel's ρ
1999-2000 2,5% 13,1%
2000-2001 2,0% 13,4%
2001-2002 3,0% 12,0%
2002-2003 2,3% 14,3%
2003-2004 11,5% 12,1%
2004-2005 12,7% 12,7%
2005-2006 8,5% 15,2%  
From Table 3 it is clear that correlation for years before 2003 are too high, while they 
tend to converge at the end of the period, coinciding with a better adjustment of IRB 
requirements in relation to estimated ones. Asset correlation thus results time 
dependent; previous to the crisis, firms’ performance depended on themselves, so 
correlation is low. After the crisis of 2002, as the economy was recovering, companies 
depend more on the realization of the systematic factor; therefore, a higher 
correlation is expected
14
.  In view of that, it is necessary to adjust the coefficient 
according to the business cycle phase. Again, IRB’s formulas are thought for developed 
economies where macro economical fluctuations are not as usual as in developing 
ones, and where PD is much lower.  
                                                           
14
 During the period 2001-2002, correlation implicit in capital requirement is low, which can be 
attributed to the high value of PD for that period (giving Basel’s formula, correlation is much lower). It 
could also be attributed to the fact that increases in correlation have certain lags, thus appearing some 
years after the crisis took place. 
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Another important pattern observed in IRB’s capital requirements is their 
procyclicality. In recession times, it increases significantly, while in expansions is lower.  
Graph 8 
GDP variation and capital requirements
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In Graph 8 one can see how the requirement increases as the GDP variation is lower, 
reaching its maximum in the period 2001-2002 when GDP fell by 11%. It should be 
remembered that period 2002-2003 is not representative, as it has fewer observations.  
As the economy recovers showing positive variations of GDP, capital requirements fall. 
Having reached this point, it is pertinent to distinguish between estimation point in 
time (PIT) and estimation through the cycle (TTC). The former emerges from using the 
PD in each period (conditional estimations), while the TTC estimation attempts to 
measure credit quality in a long time horizon, thus incorporating cyclical aspects of the 
economy. Therefore, the procyclicality could be reduced when using TTC estimations 
of PD. 
Graph 9  
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Graph 9 presents the point-in-time requirements, which are the ones that have been 
calculated in conditional distributions. Horizontal line represents the unconditional 
estimation, which could be interpreted as the through-the-cycle requirement.  
If we want capital requirements to reflect the risk profile of institutions, then 
procyclicality should not be a problem. It is reasonable that in recession, when credit 
quality deteriorates, the risk associated is higher and so the capital requirement is. 
There is a trade-off between procyclicality and risk measurement. If we calculate 
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requirements with the standardized approach (with fixed risk weights), we observe 
that they do not vary with economic cycle, thus being useless as an indicator of risk.  
Graph 10 
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Lastly, as mentioned in Part I, a risk-insensitive requirement does not allow for 
inferring about the economic capital of a bank, and does not reflect changes in 
portfolio’s risk profile, thus making that market agents unable to monitor institutions 
and impeding the implementation of risk management policies.  
2.2 Retail portfolio 
The retail portfolio was not segmented by type of facility. This could lead to differences 
as some parameters are fixed for mortgage and revolving loans. The former have an 
asset correlation of 15% while for the last ones it is set at 4%. Table 7 presents 
estimations for this kind of borrower, and graphs for each distribution function could 
be found in Appendix C.  
Table 7: Estimation for retail portfolio 
Expected St. Dev. 99.9th percentile Expected St. Dev. 99.9th percentile
1999-2000 4,13 0,79 7,86 3,19% 0,56% 5,62% 2,43%
2000-2001 6,18 0,58 8,26 3,84% 0,37% 5,11% 1,27%
2001-2002 57,90 3,11 69,00 17,86% 0,91% 20,71% 2,85%
2002-2003 3,54 0,28 4,47 2,20% 0,19% 2,82% 0,62%
2003-2004 2,52 0,31 3,66 2,69% 0,34% 3,88% 1,19%
2004-2005 2,49 0,21 3,19 2,70% 0,23% 3,47% 0,77%
2005-2006 0,85 0,11 1,23 1,66% 0,22% 2,43% 0,77%
incondicional 13,10 1,35 18,40 6,78% 0,64% 9,19% 2,41%
Unexpected 
loss
Losses in million USD Loss rate
 
In contrast with corporate portfolio, distribution for retail has a major component of 
expected loss, which results in substantially lower capital requirements. By looking at 
graphs corresponding to each kind of debtor
15
 it is clear that corporate portfolio has a 
more asymmetrical distribution, thus indicating more volatility and higher 
requirements due to unexpected loss.  
                                                           
15
 Presented in Appendix B and C. 
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Table 8: Comparison of IRB and Non parametric estimations for retail portfolio 
1999-2000 5,55% 2,29
2000-2001 5,78% 4,56
2001-2002 9,57% 3,35
2002-2003 5,30% 8,53
2003-2004 5,42% 4,56
2004-2005 5,42% 7,04
2005-2006 5,16% 6,72
unconditional 7,10% 2,94
period K (IRB) IRB/Estim.
 
Previous analysis summarized in Tables 7 and 8 is indicating that there is an important 
difference between IRB’s requirements and estimated ones. From Graph 13 it can be 
seen that unexpected loss is a minor part of total retail’s losses.  
Graph 11 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1999-
2000
2000-
2001
2001-
2002
2002-
2003
2003-
2004
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
Perdidas esperadas e inesperadas - Familias
EL UL (99.9%)
Expected and Unexpected loss - ret il
 
Correlations were computed in the same way we did for corporate, also resulting in 
higher coefficients in case of applying Basel’s formula.   
Table 91: Asset Correlation 
estimated ρ Basel's ρ
1999-2000 2,0% 4,1%
2000-2001 0,5% 3,7%
2001-2002 0,5% 3,0%
2002-2003 0,3% 5,4%
2003-2004 0,7% 4,6%
2004-2005 0,3% 4,6%
2005-2006 0,6% 6,6%  
It can be thought that the performance of this kind of borrower is less depending on 
the general state of the economy, and that’s why the correlation is much higher in 
Basel’s formula. Again, calibration is crucial. It should also be mentioned that the 
confidence level of 99.9% is too high for this portfolio. If we set it at 95%, IRB’s 
requirements would be closer to our estimations. In conclusion, calibration of the 
formula is fundamental as we may overestimate unexpected loss of retail portfolio. 
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IV. Conclusions  
IRB approach implies an important advance in credit risk measurement and also 
contributes to make capital requirements more close to the economic capital of the 
bank. Uruguayan banking regulation has developed recently in line with making 
requirements more risk-sensitive. In this sense, it could be possible to apply the 
Foundation IRB, where institutions estimate PD’s, and the SIIF establish the rest of 
parameters. Once the procedures and statistical models are validated, the Advanced 
IRB could be implemented, although it would be a long-term project.   
This paper serve as a first approximation to understand the IRB approach, and the 
consequences it could have if applied to Uruguayan institutions. From a regulator’s 
point of view, the capital requirement that emerge from IRB’s formulas seems to 
overestimate unexpected loss for some type of borrowers. In view of results presented 
in Part II, the risk weight functions should be smoothed, to count for the observed 
characteristics of the economy. As mentioned before, calibration of parameters has 
been done for the group of the tenth major supervisors, where portfolio’s 
characteristics are far different from emerging banking institutions. According to our 
estimations, asset correlations and confidence level should be modified. The method 
also help in accomplishing with pillars 2 and 3, as it provides a measure  that reflects 
the risk assumed by an institution, and the main determinants of it. Market agents’ 
thus can monitor bank’s risk strategies, having more information when making 
decisions. Actual capital requirements based in the standardized approach do not 
allow to infer about the risk profile, as risk weights are fixed for different credit 
facilities (as an example, all loans to non-financial sector denominated in local currency 
have a 100% weight)
16
.  
In case of applying the IRB, banks will have to develop internal models to estimate 
PD’s, which implies having a large historical database, as well as procedures to validate 
results (back testing). Being PD’s estimation the most important element for the 
approach, the supervisor’s role is crucial, as it will validate models, in terms of their 
accuracy and predictability power. Related to this aspect, non parametric estimation 
becomes a useful tool to validate models, as it gives an empirical measure of 
portfolio’s losses that can be compared with the ones that result from internal models. 
The main advantage of non parametric estimation is the lack of assumptions about the 
form of the distribution.  
The method of estimation also helps when adjusting capital requirements of Basel’s 
formula to emerging economies’ characteristics. In that sense, parameters such as 
asset correlation could be estimated by bootstrap techniques, thus reflecting more 
properly different realities of banking systems.  
To conclude, it seems necessary to have capital requirements that reflect the risk 
profile of institutions. The IRB method offers an excellent opportunity to establish 
better techniques of risk measurement, with more sophisticated tools and therefore a 
better understanding of the risk that a bank is taking. There is no doubt about the 
suitability of IRB measures for monitoring risk assumed by banks, as it could be seen as 
                                                           
16
  With the exception of mortgage loans, whose weight is 75%.  
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the economic capital of an institution. However, regulators should be careful about 
parameter’s calibration as they may not reflect the reality of some banking systems. 
Another issue for regulators to take into account is the potential procyclicality behind 
this approach.  
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Appendix A – Properties of the loss distribution     
1. Density function 
Starting from the cumulative distribution function, 







 −−
=
−−
ρ
ρ
ρ
)()(1
);;(
11 pNxN
NpxF     
Calling A the term between brackets, density function can be expressed as: 
           
Where       
    [1] 
Being   , then .  As we can observe,  and  are inverse 
expressions, so we can state that: 
      [2] 
Using [2] in equation [1], we have: 
      
Thus, 
   
 Taking previous results, density function has the following expression:  
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2. The mean 
It will be demonstrated that the mean of the loss distribution is p; in analytical terms, 
that is: 
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To do that, consider the next function of p: 
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





+−−−
−
= −−−∫
21
2
11
1
0
)(
2
1
)()(1
2
1
exp
1
)( ρ
ρρ
ρ
 
Demonstration will take three steps: 
1) [ ] [ ] [ ]

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
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,, xNpNxNpxf ρ
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ρ
ρ  is a 
densities’ distribution family for values of ρ  є (0;1) and also for different values 
of p є (0;1). 
 
2) The derivative of J(p) with respect to p equals 1; analytically: 
 
 
1
)(
=
dp
pdJ
 
3) Having shown 1) and 2), J(p) will have the following generic form: 
kppJ +=)( ,  where k is a constant.  
If we prove that
2
1
)
2
1
( =J , then we know that k=0. 
 
Taking into account 2) and 3), we can conclude that ppJ =)( , which is what we want 
to demonstrate.  
 
1st step: Observe that [ ] 0,, ≥pxf ρ  for x є (0;1) and for ρ є (0;1). Then, to show that 
it is a density function it is only necessary to prove that the total probability for all 
possible values of x is 1; 
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Consider next change of variable: 
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Rearranging terms: 
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The suggested change of variable make the standard normal density function appears, 
so we know that the area under that function is 1.  
2nd step: 
1
)(
=
dp
pdJ
 
Previously, let’s make the same change of variable we did before:  
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Then: 
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Using Leibnitz result, we can take derivatives with respect to p inside the integral:  
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Forgetting for a while the integral, we evaluate the terms related to the exponential 
function:  
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Now back to the integral we have: 
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Making the change of variable: 
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The following is true: 
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So it has been demonstrated that derivative of J(p) equals unity. 
3th step: 
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−N and substituting in J(p) we have: 
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As we know from the first step that the integral of the second term equals 1. Here we took 
that result applying for the special case of p=1/2. 
Continuing with the expression: 
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Calling G(x) to the function inside the integral: 
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h(x) is an odd function for x=1/2; and p(x) is an even function for x=1/2. 
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So it can be stated that: 
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As the product of an odd function by an even function is odd, then G(x) is odd for 
x=1/2. 
Then: 
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That is, to make that the average point between two values x and x’ be ½, G(x) must 
take opposite values. This implies that: 
∫ =
1
0
0)( dxxG  
What we wanted to demonstrate. 
3. The mode 
We must obtain the maximum of the density function.  
 
To simplify, let’s call h the term between braces, so that: 
 
Simplifying the previous expression and equaling to zero, we have: 
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The first three terms are positive
17
, so to obtain the mode it is enough to equal to zero 
the last term,  
 
 
 
4. The median 
The value of x that accumulates the 50% of the distribution is given by:  

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
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 −− −−
ρ
ρ )()(1 11 pNxN
N = 0.5 
 
So the median is:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17
 Remember that , a positive number.  
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Appendix B – Estimations for corporate portfolio  
Conditional distribution: period 1999-2000 
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Conditional distribution: period 2000-2001 
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Conditional distribution: period 2001-2002 
Loss rate Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2002-2003 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2003-2004 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2004-2005 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2005-2006 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Unconditional distribution: period 1999-2006 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Appendix C – Estimations for retail portfolio                       
Conditional distribution: period 1999-2000 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2000-2001 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
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Conditional distribution: period 2002-2003 
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Conditional distribution: period 2004-2005 
Loss rate                                                                  Loss in USD 
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
D
e
n
s
it
y
.02 .025 .03 .035 .04
tasa
           
0
5
.0
e
-0
7
1
.0
e
-0
6
1
.5
e
-0
6
2
.0
e
-0
6
D
e
n
s
it
y
1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000 3500000
perdidas
 
 
 
Loan portfolio loss distribution: Basel’s II unifactorial approach vs Non parametric estimations 
 
42 | P a g e  
 
Conditional distribution: period 2005-2006 
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Unconditional distribution: period 1999-2006 
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